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Abstract
We conducted a survey about the 2014 FIFA World Cup that measured attitudes about
FIFA, players, and officials in 18 languages with 4600 respondents from 29 countries. Sixty
percent of respondents perceived FIFA officials as being dishonest, and people from coun-
tries with less institutional corruption and stronger rule of law perceived FIFA officials as
being more corrupt and less competent running the tournament than people from countries
with more corruption and weaker rule of law. In contrast, respondents evaluated players as
skilled and honest and match officials as competent and honest. We discuss the implica-
tions of our findings for perceptions of corruption in general.
Introduction
Corruption is a worldwide problem. It not only siphons resources away from those who earn
and deserve them, but it can also distort economic incentives so as to impair growth. It
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weakens public trust in institutions, thereby damaging the view that authority is exercised
legitimately. Corruption can also damage the social fabric, so that instead of a productive,
cooperative society, people live in cynical, fragmented, uncooperative collections of individu-
als. See Dimant and Tosato [1] for a review of the causes and consequences of corruption.
Corruption has been studied primarily in terms of governmental corruption (e.g., World
Bank, Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, [2]), but other institutions can also be corrupt. Percep-
tions of corruption in government can be confounded with patriotism and political partisan-
ship, so it can be instructive to examine perceived corruption in a non-governmental
organization. The present investigation studied people’s perceptions of corruption in FIFA
(the Fédération Internationale de Football Association). FIFA is a huge international organiza-
tion that oversees one of the world’s most celebrated and widely followed sports events, the
World Cup tournament of football. Football is referred to as soccer in some places, but given
that football is the term used by most people internationally and is the term that is part of
FIFA, we will refer to the sport as football. National teams from the 208 member countries of
FIFA compete for two years, after which the 32 teams with the best records meet for a tourna-
ment to determine the world champion. The worldwide interest in this tournament made it
possible to compare perceptions across many different countries.
We surveyed citizens in multiple countries about their perceptions of corruption in connec-
tion with the 2014 World Cup, including how they perceived the players, the referees, and
FIFA itself. Of particular interest was the question of how general (governmental) corruption
in a country was related to how the residents of that country perceived corruption in football.
Opposing hypotheses, corresponding roughly to assimilation and contrast, were entertained.
We should note that the present study concerns perceptions of the men’s World Cup. FIFA
also organizes a World Cup for women, but to our knowledge, there have not been allegations
of corruption in FIFA concerning the women’s World Cup.
Is football corrupt?
The question of corruption in FIFA may strike informed readers as quaint, given that the last
few years have seen highly publicized trials and dismissals of top officials; however, the present
survey preceded much of this negative publicity. Specifically, the data were collected in 2014,
during and shortly after the tournament’s final rounds. The tournament was conducted in Bra-
zil, whose government corruption scandals have also been prominent in the news—but again
this was just starting in 2014.
Still, the international football news had already contained some signs that FIFA had a cor-
ruption problem. A decade earlier, Sugden and Tomlinson [3] wrote a widely acclaimed
exposé, “Badfellas” that described systematic corruption in world football, with a focus on
FIFA. The book was so critical of FIFA that FIFA tried to ban its publication [4].
To be sure, worse was to come, and it became reasonable to assume that FIFA was indeed
corrupt. In 2014 a special investigator, Michael Garcia, a former US federal prosecutor, was
appointed to investigate the awarding of the 2018 and 2022 World Cups to Russia and Qatar.
Garcia resigned after FIFA decided not to release the report [5]. Moreover, numerous FIFA
officials have been charged by the US and Swiss governments with corruption [6]. Following
the 2014 Cup (the focus of this study) Sugden and Tomlinson [4] updated their 2003 book to
include a discussion of the removal of Sepp Blatter, the president of FIFA, on suspicion of
corruption.
Moreover, charges of corruption have not been limited to the international governing body
(FIFA). For example, what is often called the Simmons Report [7] concluded explicitly and
directly that both Jack Warner (a former president of the Confederation of North, Central
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American and Caribbean Association) and Chuck Blazer (a former General Secretary of CON-
CACAF) had committed “fraud against CONCACAF” (p. vii). Blazer died in July of 2017 after
cooperating with the US FBI, and Warner is currently (January, 2019) fighting extradition to
the US to stand trial on corruption charges [8].
A particular issue is whether perceptions of corruption would include players and referees.
Referees are expected to be impartial, but in many sports the fairness and impartiality of offi-
cials have been questioned. In a classic study of motivated social perception, Hastorf and Can-
tril [9], students counted rule infractions in a taped (American) college football game, and
these tallies were systematically biased in favor of their own college’s team. Given such biases
among fans, even a perfectly fair and impartial official can be suspected of bias by some
viewers.
As to the players themselves, there are occasional accusations of players being paid to lose
games, though whether that occurs at the high level of competition that exists in the World
Cup is not clear. Still, some unfair play has been subject to commentary, most notably when
players react to minor physical contact by falling down dramatically (often informally called
“flopping” of “diving”) in the hope that the official will charge the other team with a penalty.
Based on Hastorf and Cantril [9], it seemed reasonable to predict that participants would rate
corruption higher on their most disliked team than on their favorite team and would suspect
referees of being biased against their favorite team.
Competing hypotheses
Our primary focus was on how perceptions of corruption in football would be related to
corruption closer to home. Such relationships can be understood in terms of comparisons
between perceptions of corruption in football, defined as a target in research on comparisons
processes, and the corruption in one’s home country, defined as a standard in research on
comparison processes. Broadly speaking, comparisons between a target and a standard can
reflect either assimilation or contrast effects. Assimilation or “carry-over” effects tend to occur
when accessible information is used to form a mental representation of a target of judgment,
whereas contrast or “backfire” effects occur when accessible information is used to form a
mental representation of the standard against which the target is being compared [10]. In
terms of comparisons per se, assimilation results in perceiving the target and the standard to
be similar, whereas contrast results in perceiving the target and the standard to be different.
In general terms, judgment may be influenced by both chronically and temporarily accessi-
ble information [11, 12], and such information can have assimilation or contrast effects,
depending on the context [10]. For example, people’s mood (a type of temporarily accessible
information) can influence people’s judgments about their satisfaction with life [13], e.g., the
more positive a person’s immediate mood is the more positively they view their life overall.
This is an assimilation effect. On the other hand, if a standard becomes more salient, a contrast
effect occurs and targets and standards are seen to differ [14]. For example, watching attractive
actors in a movie can lower the perceived attraction of one’s romantic partner [15]. In this
example, the standard (actors in a movie) are salient, and this leads people to see their partners
(the targets) as dissimilar (less attractive).
In the present study, it was possible to predict either a positive or negative relationship
between a country’s level of corruption and perceptions of corruption in FIFA. Importantly,
we did not rely on citizens’ own ratings of corruption in their country, partly because we were
concerned that answering questions about corruption in FIFA might alter ratings of corrup-
tion of one’s own country, or vice versa. That is, we were concerned about any effects of tem-
porarily accessible information. Hence we relied on independent ratings of country-by-
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country corruption, which are regularly supplied and updated by the World Bank [2]. Thus,
our study examined relationships between societal corruption, as assessed by the World Bank,
and subjective perceptions of corruption in football, as rated by our participants.
The assimilation hypothesis is that citizens in highly corrupt countries would be most likely
to perceive and condemn FIFA as corrupt. Multiple cognitive processes could contribute to
this effect. People who live in corrupt countries are presumably familiar with corruption and
can recognize its telltale signs more readily than those who do not encounter corruption very
much. They may expect and assume that corruption is widespread and perhaps that it may be
a simple fact of life. In this case, frequent exposure to corruption becomes chronically accessi-
ble, and this information could be used when evaluating the target, namely FIFA.
A contrast effect leads to the opposite relationship. People who live in corrupt societies may
gradually cease to notice it or become desensitized to it, whereas in non-corrupt countries,
people may expect fairness and transparency, and so indications of corruption will stand out
as serious violations of expectancies. This information would be used to form the standard, to
which the target would be compared.
Anecdotally, one of us has heard several highly educated friends firmly assert that today’s
United States is a highly corrupt society—yet when asked whether they themselves had ever
paid a bribe, they each said no. The World Bank rates the United States low in corruption, so
these perceptions of corruption suggest a contrast effect. Then again, people who have never
paid bribes may be less prone to notice signs of corruption (including subtle requests for
bribes) than others.
Thus, it was possible to predict either a positive or negative relationship between a country’s
level of corruption and how much its football fans perceive corruption in FIFA. Hypotheses
about perceived corruption in referees and players were more tentative. The assimilation
hypothesis assumes that corruption is widespread, and so it might well extend to seeing refer-
ees and players as corrupt—though news reports had not begun to implicate referees or play-
ers, unlike FIFA itself. The lack of such reports would especially undermine the contrast
process, which relies on some evidence of corruption to stimulate the outraged reaction. Last,
bias in perception (as shown by Hastorf and Cantril [9]) would incline people to rate their
most disliked team as more corrupt than their favorite team.
The present study
Given the international nature of the World Cup, we aimed to obtain an international sample.
We collected data anonymously via a website that was available in 18 languages. The survey
was brief and took less than 5 minutes to complete, something we believed enhanced coopera-
tion. Participants answered background questions about themselves, (demographic questions
and satisfaction with life) and questions about the World Cup (the players, officials, the teams,
and FIFA). These data provided a basis to examine relationships between perceptions of the
World Cup and a country level measure of corruption that we created using widely accepted
indices made available by the World Bank.
We asked questions about the players, officials, and teams to control for the possibility that
perceptions of corruption in FIFA reflected some type of broader negative evaluation of foot-
ball or dissatisfaction with life in general. Although our primary focus was on perceptions of
corruption in FIFA, these additional measures allowed us to determine if relationships
between country-level corruption and perceptions of corruption in FIFA would vary after con-
trolling for perceptions of different aspects of football. If the relationship between country-
level corruption and perceptions of corruption in FIFA did not change after controlling for
these other measures this would suggest that perceptions of corruption in FIFA reflected
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evaluations of FIFA per se and not a more generalized perception of corruption or more gen-
eralized positive or negative evaluations. This can be thought of as examining the divergent
validity of our measure of perceived corruption in FIFA.
Method
Respondents and sampling procedure
Our goal was to obtain as broad a sample as possible from as many countries as possible.
Respondents were made aware of the study in various ways such as newspaper articles, press
releases, postings on blogs related to football, requests to football associations, and so forth.
We focused on countries that had a team in the Cup, but we did not limit respondents to those
countries. We relied in part on a “snowball” approach wherein those who took the survey
would recommend or encourage others to do the same. The difficulties we had in obtaining
respondents and the limitations imposed by our sample are discussed later.
The finals of the 2014 FIFA World Cup began on 12 June 2014 and ended on 13 July 2014.
The group stages ended on 26 June, and the knock-out rounds began on 28 June. The survey
was first posted on 10 July (just before the semi-finals), and we stopped collecting data on 11
August, although it should be noted that 92% of our final sample had responded by 20 July.
Setting the beginning and end dates of the data collection window reflected two consider-
ations. First, we wanted the bulk of the tournament to have been completed to maximize the
information on which respondents could base their responses. Second, we wanted to collect
data before the tournament had ended and while it was still in the public conversation (media
attention, etc.), assuming that this would result in a larger number of respondents. In terms of
the end date, we felt that a few weeks was the maximum time that people’s memories would
remain reasonably fresh. Moreover, there were few new responses each day after 1 August.
The study protocol was approved by the College of William Mary Committee for the Pro-
tection of Human Subjects, protocol: PHSC-2014-07-03-9689-jbnezl. Participants provided
written consent by indicating this on the first page of the survey.
Survey instrument
The survey instrument was developed by the research team with specific attention to wording
items in ways that would provide the easiest translations from English (the base language) to
other languages. The construction of the items and responses was also guided by the recom-
mendations offered by Gehlbach and Brinkworth [16]. The resulting English base version was
translated and back-translated by individuals who were fluent in English and another lan-
guage. Participants were able to complete the survey in one of the following languages: English,
Portuguese (Brazilian), Dutch, French, German, Greek, Italian, Korean, Persian, Polish, Portu-
guese (Portugal), Russian, Spanish, Turkish, Ukrainian, Japanese, Croatian, and Czech.
People provided their responses via a secure website with a greeting and introduction in
their language of choice. The survey had six parts: background questions about the respondent
and measures of respondents’ perceptions of the players, the officials, of their favorite and least
favorite teams, and of FIFA. A copy of the English base version of the survey is available as part
of the Supplemental Materials (https://osf.io/z5rbp/?view_only=
2b25601521fd45db865964c45af86553), and the items that are discussed in this paper are pro-
vided below. Unless indicated otherwise, all responses were made on 5-point scales in which 5
represented more, greater, stronger, and so forth, and 1 represented less, fewer, or weaker.
Given the lack of research about this topic, although questions were organized in terms of top-
ics, we did not treat questions about the same topic as measured variables of latent constructs.
Our analyses and consequent discussion focuses on individual measures.
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We should note that given the lack of quantitative research on perceptions of corruption
in sport we included measures of numerous constructs that might call into question the
validity of our analyses about relationships between perceptions of corruption in FIFA
and country-level corruption. We could not be certain what types of perceptions would be
related to perceptions of corruption in FIFA in ways that would undermine the strength
of the inference of the analyses regarding our primary hypothesis of interest. For example,
would people’s evaluations of the players or the officials be related to perceptions of FIFA,
and if so, what aspects of these evaluations would be related, competence, motivation, or
honesty? Although we had no compelling reasons to expect that controlling for individual
differences in these measures would compromise our results, we included them to address
such possibilities.
These additional measures also addressed issues of divergent validity. For example, if the
relationship between country-level corruption and perceptions of corruption in FIFA did not
change after controlling for individual differences in perceptions of corruption among refer-
ees, this would suggest that perceptions of corruption among FIFA is a construct that is dis-
tinct from perceptions of corruption among referees. The data we collected also allowed us to
address the issue that perceptions of corruption in FIFA would primarily reflect a sort of global
good-bad judgment rather than a judgment about FIFA per se. We included good-bad evalua-
tions of various components of the Cup to do this.
Respondents began by answering two background questions: How interested were you in
the World Cup, and overall, how satisfied are you with your life in general. We asked the
question about interest in the Cup to examine how engaged participants were with the Cup
(did they care about the competition) and to control for the possibility that perceptions of
corruption of FIFA reflected how much people cared about the Cup, e.g., “I don’t care about
the Cup, so why think about corruption in FIFA?” The question about life satisfaction was
included to control for the possibility that evaluations of FIFA reflected how satisfied partici-
pants were with their lives (i.e., evaluations of their lives) rather than evaluations of FIFA
per se.
They then answered three questions about the players, each of which started with the stem
“Thinking of all the players on all the teams . . .” The questions asked: how much do you think
the players cared about winning, how skilled do you think the players were, and how much of
a problem do you think “flopping,” "diving," and other ways of feigning a foul were. These
questions were included to examine the possibility that participants’ evaluations of FIFA
reflected their overall evaluations of the players. These questions concerned players’ motiva-
tion, their skills, and one of the most obvious indicators of players’ bending (if not breaking)
the rules of the game.
Respondents also answered a series of questions about their most favorite and about their
least favorite team. For present purposes, we analyzed two of these questions: “Do you think
any of the players on this team were corrupt?” and “In general, how neutral do you think the
officials were in the matches involving this team?” Responses to the second question were
made on a 5-point scale with endpoints labelled 1 = were strongly against this team 5 = were
strongly in favor of this team, and a midpoint labelled 3 = were neutral. These items were
included to examine the possibility that perceptions of corruption in FIFA were colored by
respondents’ perceptions of corruption among players in two salient teams (favored and least
favored) or perceptions of possible corruption among officials who refereed matches involving
these teams.
Then there were five questions about the referees: Overall, please rate the quality of the ref-
erees, How accurate were the referees in terms of calling offsides, In general, what do you
think of how the referees called fouls, In general, how well do you think the referees noticed
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“flopping,” “diving” and other ways of feigning a foul, Do you think any referees were corrupt,
e.g., accepted money to favor one team or another. For the third question about fouls, the mid-
point was labelled “just right.”
Similar to the rationale for including questions about the players, these questions
were included to control for the possibility that perceptions of FIFA reflect or result from
perceptions of the quality of the referees. Referees are the immediate manifestation of the
authorities that run a tournament, and participants’ beliefs about FIFA may reflect their per-
ceptions of the quality of the referees. We asked specific questions about offsides and feign-
ing fouls because these can be prominent calls in matches particularly when they involve the
negation of a goal (in the case of offsides) or the awarding of a penalty kick (in the case of a
foul).
Respondents answered two questions about FIFA: Do you think FIFA does a good job or
not organizing the World Cup, deciding about the location, hiring officials, and so forth, and
Do you think that the leaders of FIFA are honest or corrupt. For the second FIFA question, the
scale points were labelled 1 = generally honest, 3 = neither honest nor corrupt, and 5 = generally
corrupt.
Measures of corruption
The primary focus of the present study was examining relationships between individuals’ per-
ceptions of corruption and societal measures of corruption and the legitimacy of government.
We used a measure of corruption from a source other than respondents because we were con-
cerned about the possibility that answering questions about corruption in FIFA might influ-
ence perceptions of corruption per se (and the reverse). Moreover, measures of corruption
from a source other than the respondents eliminated the possibility that relationships between
corruption and other measures could be due to unmeasured individual differences that were
related to both corruption and our other measures.
We created a country-level measure of corruption and the legitimacy of government using
a series of measures organized by the World Bank [2]. Collectively, these measures are usually
referred to as the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The WGI consists of six indica-
tors: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government Effective-
ness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. Following inspection of the
data that were used to create these indices, the composite measure we created did not include
Voice and Accountability because we did not think the content of the measure was sufficiently
relevant to corruption to merit inclusion in our study. The definitions of the measures that
were included are below. Each describes the state of affairs in a country in 2013. See Treisman
[17] for a discussion of measuring societal level corruption.
The World Bank created a standard score for each measure based on a sample of 215 coun-
tries. The individual measures represent combinations of various sources. As described by the
World Bank: “These aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number of enterprise,
citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. They are based
on over 30 individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-
governmental organizations, international organizations, and private sector firms.” http://info.
worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism. Reflects perceptions of the likeli-
hood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
Government effectiveness. Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the qual-
ity of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality
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of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commit-
ment to such policies.
Regulatory quality. Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
Rule of law. Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
Control of corruption. Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exer-
cised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture"
of the state by elites and private interests.
Although each of these measures assessed a different characteristic, we suspected that they
were all measures of an underlying entity reflecting stable, reliable, and trustworthy govern-
ments and societies. This suspicion was confirmed by a Principal Components Analysis that
found that all five measures loaded on a single factor (all loadings above .80). Also, treating all
five items as a single scale produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .96. In light of this, we calculated a
measure that was the average of these five measures, which we refer to as WB13 (World Bank,
2013) in the analysis below. Note that for this measure higher scores indicate greater political
stability, greater government effectiveness, better regulatory quality, stronger rule of law, and
more control of corruption.
In terms of using this aggregate instead of the single Control of Corruption measure, we
should note that corruption has numerous sources and is manifested in many ways [1]. For
example, the measure Rule of Law includes how well contracts are enforced. Shoddy contract
performance is a characteristics of a corrupt society. In corrupt societies, the enforcement
of contracts will vary as a function of how the contracted parties are viewed by the civil
authorities, which is a prima facie form of corruption. In contrast, in non-corrupt societies
contracts are enforced according to the rule of law. The other measures also contain aspects of
corruption.
NB: Numerous measures of societal level corruption are available. One of the more popular
measures is the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) developed and maintained by Transpar-
ency International [18]. The present measure WB13 was highly correlated with the CPI for
2013 (at least .95 depending on the exact sample), and as might be expected given this, the
results of analyses using the CPI were very similar to the results we report below involving the
WB13 measure. Nevertheless, on balance we thought the constructs on which the WB13 was
based made it a better measure for our purposes.
Sample characteristics
A total of 5735 individuals from 81 countries logged onto the website and answered some of
the questions. In terms of selecting countries to be included in the analyses, there were coun-
tries that could not be included because there were not enough respondents. We included only
respondents who resided in countries for which there were 10 or more respondents. This left a
total of 5422 respondents.
We realize that 10 is not a particularly stringent criterion for including a country, but
we believed that it represented a good compromise among various considerations. Most
important, we wanted to include as many countries as possible to maximize the power of
our analyses and the representativeness of our sample. Moreover, the analyses we used took
into account the number of observations in each country (part of a process known as “Bayes
shrinkage”), so that countries with fewer observations influenced parameter estimates less
than countries with more observations.
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Noting this, although the units of analysis (countries) are weighted, the number of countries
still matters, and this is particularly important in terms of the power of analyses that involve
level 2 (country-level) measures. So, for hypotheses involving relationships between country-
level measures of corruption and country-level means of perceptions of FIFA, the number of
level 2 observations (country) is the most important determinant of power. If we had cut at 20
respondents per country, the number of countries in the analyses would have been 23.
We thought that cutting at 20 respondents per country eliminated too many countries in
terms of the representativeness of the countries that would have been retained and in terms
of statistical power. Including countries that had 10 or more respondents left 29 countries, a
number close to 30, an often-cited minimum to provide adequate power to test fixed effects
(e.g., Scherbaum [19]). Although more countries would have provided more power, we
thought that including countries that had 10 or more respondents was a reasonable balance
between including as many countries as possible while reducing the influence of countries
that did not have enough respondents to constitute a representative sample (admittedly, with
representative defined generously). We should note that the results of analyses that retained
countries that had 5 or more respondents (N = 37) were functionally equivalent to the results
presented in this paper. The number of respondents for each country for the final sample is
presented in Table 1, and the raw country and respondent level data are available as part of the
supplemental materials for which the link was provided previously.
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Although the final sample was 5422, the functional sample was closer to 4638 because 784
participants answered only the questions about satisfaction with life and interest in the World
Cup. The number of respondents who answered each question varied, and the number of valid
responses for each question is included in the descriptive statistics presented in Table 2. Given
the focus of this paper on corruption, for questions about the most and least favorite teams, we
present statistics only for player corruption and the neutrality of referees.
Performing a multilevel analysis requires that one set of observations is nested within
another. We could have nested individuals in countries in various ways (country of residence,
country of citizenship, country of birth), but on balance we thought that country of residence
was the most straightforward. Most important, we felt that the norms of one’s country of resi-
dence would be the most salient set of norms for individuals. Second, for 81% of respondents,
their country of residence was the same as their country of citizenship. Moreover, given that
we did not know how long non-citizens had been residing out of their country of citizenship,
we could not make some type of adjustment for this. Nevertheless, controlling for whether an
individual was a citizen of the country in which he or she resided (represented as a binary mea-
sure) did not change any of the results reported below, and we do not report or discuss this
aspect of the analyses.
Results
Overview of analyses and descriptive statistics
For the primary analyses, we conceptualized the data as a two level structure in which individ-
ual respondents were nested within countries of residence, and following the guidelines and
procedures described by Nezlek [20], we used the program HLM to conduct a series of multi-
level models (MLM). These analyses were conceptually equivalent to conducting a regression
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for survey responses concerning players, officials, and FIFA.
Item Mean Variance Respondents
Between Within
Players. . .
Cared about winning 4.24 .07 .49 4604
Skilled 3.66 .09 .59 4584
Problems w/ feigning fouls 3.21 .11 1.03 4559
Officials. . .
Overall quality 2.86 .09 .69 4533
Accurate calling offsides 3.37 .05 .73 4489
Too few/too many fouls 2.71 .05 .76 4505
Noticed feigning fouls 2.71 .05 .72 4495
Were any corrupt 2.08 .06 .79 4498
Favorite team. . .
Players corrupt 1.36 .04 .36 4098
Officials neutral 2.87 .02 .23 4108
Least favorite team. . .
Players corrupt 1.73 .07 .87 2861
Officials neutral 3.36 .07 .43 2881
FIFA. . .
Good job organizing 2.58 .06 .97 4549
Officials honest or corrupt 3.72 .16 1.11 4459
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222492.t002
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analysis for each country and then using the coefficients estimated in these analyses as depen-
dent measures at the next level of analysis.
The first analyses were null models, i.e., no predictors at either level of analysis. These mod-
els provided the basic multilevel summary statistics: the estimated mean, the variances at each
level of analysis, and the number of valid observations for each measure. These summary sta-
tistics also provided a context for evaluating the analyses that focus on the primary hypothesis.
Perceptions of FIFA need to be understood within the context of participants’ overall evalua-
tion of the Cup and of their lives in general. For example, did people see the players and offi-
cials in a positive light? If FIFA is seen negatively whereas other aspects of the Cup are seen
positively this would suggest that evaluations of FIFA are distinct from evaluations of other
aspects of the Cup. In turn, this would suggest that evaluations of FIFA do not simply reflect
the operation of some global good-bad evaluative mechanism.
These null models are given below. There were i people nested within j countries. The
within-country (level 1) variance is the variance of rij, and the between-country (level 2) vari-
ance is the variance of u0j.
Within-country : yij ¼ b0j þ rij
Between-country : b0j ¼ g00 þ u0j
The results of these analyses are summarized in Table 2. As can be seen from the variance
estimates in the table, the majority of the variance for each of these measures is at the within-
country level, i.e., across individuals. Although means for countries did vary (the column
labelled “Between”), individuals within a country varied more from one another than coun-
tries varied from one another.
Overall evaluations of players and match officials
Generally speaking, as can be seen from the means presented in Table 2, the results of these
analyses suggested that participants had more positive opinions of the players and the officials
than they had of FIFA. In some instances, the distributions of the ratings of the players and
the officials were the mirror images of the distributions of the ratings of FIFA. Such differences
suggest that participants’ evaluations of FIFA as an organization were distinct from their evalu-
ations of other aspects of the Cup.
In terms of the players, on average, respondents thought that the players were strongly
motivated to win and that they were skilled. Respondents also thought that feigning fouls was
a problem. Nearly three-quarters of respondents (3359 out of 4559) thought that feigning a
foul was a problem (i.e., selected a response of 3 or higher with 3 labeled “a problem”).
Perceptions of the referees were also generally positive. The mean rating of the quality of
referees, 2.87, was just below the midpoint of the scale (3), which was labeled acceptable.
Although this was significantly less than the midpoint (p< .05), the absolute difference was
small, and approximately three-quarters of respondents (75.8%) selected option 3, 4, or 5, rep-
resenting a rating of acceptable or better. In terms of corruption, respondents thought that
the referees were generally honest. The mean was 2.08 on a scale with a midpoint of 3 labeled
“some were corrupt.” This mean rating was significantly less than the midpoint (t = 18.4, p<
.0001). It is worth noting that of the 4498 people who answered this questions, 1535 (34.1%)
selected option 1 labeled “no referees were corrupt,” and 1747 (38.8%) selected option 2.
Although these may not be glowing evaluations, taken together, they suggest that respondents
were generally satisfied with the quality of the officiating. Less generously, one could conclude
that respondents were not dissatisfied.
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Although we did not ask a question about corruption among players overall, we did ask
questions about corruption of players on respondents’ favorite and least favorite teams. Of the
4098 respondents who answered this question, 3103 (76%) reported that no players were cor-
rupt on their favorite team, and only 5% selected response option 3, 4, or 5 (3 = some were cor-
rupt, 5 = almost all were). As might be expected, respondents’ opinions about the corruption
of their least favorite team were not as positive. Of the 2861 respondents who answered this
question, just over half (1550, 54%) thought that no players were corrupt on their least favorite
team, and 19% selected response option 3, 4, or 5.
We also asked respondents whether they thought the referees were biased toward or against
their favorite and least favorite teams. Respondents generally felt their favorites deserve better
treatment: they did perceive a slight bias of the officials against the respondent’s own favorite
team, a mean of 2.87, which was just below the scale midpoint of 3 (neutral); however, this
bias was smaller than the perceived bias of referees in favor of their least favorite team (3.36,
t = 5.75, p< .001).
Overall perceptions of FIFA
Perceptions of FIFA were not as positive as perceptions of referee and players. In terms of
FIFA’s competence in organizing the Cup, respondents felt that FIFA did slightly less than an
acceptable job, a mean of 2.60 on a scale with a midpoint of 3 labeled acceptable. Just under
half of the 4549 respondents (2036, 44.8%) selected either option 1 or 2 (less than acceptable).
Respondents also did not view FIFA positively in terms of corruption. On a scale with a mid-
point labeled “neither honest nor corrupt” and an endpoint labeled “generally corrupt” the
mean response was 3.73. It is worth noting that out of the 4559 people who answered this ques-
tion, only 570 (12.6%) selected 1 or 2, the scale points associated with some degree of honesty.
2744 respondents (60.2%) selected 4 or 5, the scale points associated with some degree of cor-
ruption–over 30% (1446) selected the maximum 5, which was labeled generally corrupt, and
1242 selected scale point 3, labeled “neither corrupt nor honest”. Although the response scales
were different, ratings of corruption for FIFA were almost the mirror image of ratings of cor-
ruption for referees.
Relationships between perceptions of corruption and country level
corruption
We examined relationships between perceptions of corruption in football and country level
corruption using a series of MLM analyses. The basic model we used is below, and the statisti-
cal significance of the relationship between WB13 and the level 1 outcome in the model was
estimated by significance of the γ01(WB13) coefficient. Keep in mind that higher scores on the
WB13 measures indicate more lawfulness, i.e., less corruption. Also, this measure was stan-
dardized within the final sample of 29 countries. The results of these analyses are summarized
in Table 3.
Level 1 : yij ¼ b0j þ rij
Level 2 : b0j ¼ g00 þ g01ðWB13Þ þ u0j
First, we examined relationships between WB13 and perceptions of the honesty/corruption
of FIFA officials, and these analyses found a significant relationship between these two mea-
sures. Given the nature of the measures, this coefficient of .17 can be interpreted as follows:
For every 1 unit increase in WB13 (and because the SD of WB13 was 1.0, this means for every
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1 SD increase), perceptions of FIFA corruptness went up .17. Keep in mind that the WB13
measure is scored so that higher numbers represent greater rule of law, lower corruption, and
so forth. The mean score for the measure of the honesty/corruptness of FIFA officials was 3.73,
well above the scale midpoint of 3.0 (t = 8.88, p< .001). Given that the scale midpoint was
labeled “neither honest nor corrupt,” and that scores above the midpoint were associated with
varying degrees of corruption, this meant that countries varied in terms of how corrupt (on
average) their residents thought FIFA officials were. We should note that no country had a
mean score on this variable below 3.0. Following a procedure described by Nezlek [21], the
estimated correlation between mean FIFA scores for a country and WB13 was .38.
A similar analysis of how competent FIFA was in organizing the Cup found a negative rela-
tionship between WB13 and perceptions of FIFA’s competence. People who lived in countries
with greater rule of law (less corruption) saw FIFA as less competent than individuals who
lived in countries with weaker rule of law (more corruption). Such a relationship is consistent
with the positive relationship between societal corruption and perceptions of corruption in
FIFA. Residents of less corrupt countries evaluated FIFA more negatively (more corrupt and
less competent) than residents of more corrupt countries. The analysis of the relationship
between WB13 and how interested respondents were in the World Cup found a non-signifi-
cant relationship.
A similar set of analyses of referees’ competence (quality) found a positive relationship
between WB13 scores and perceptions of the general competence of referees. People who lived
in countries with less corruption saw referees as more competent than individuals who lived
in countries with more corruption. Note that this is the reverse relationship than was found
between WB13 scores and perceptions of FIFA’s competence. Unlike the results of the analyses
of corruption in FIFA, we did not find a significant relationship between WB13 scores and
perceptions of how corrupt referees were. There were also no significant relationships between
WB13 scores and perceived neutrality of referees toward one’s favorite team or toward one’s
least favorite team, and there were no significant relationships between WB13 scores and per-
ceived corruption of players on one’s favorite team or on one’s least favorite team.
Controlling relationships between country-level corruption and
perceptions of corruption in FIFA for individual differences in other
measures
We measured a variety of individual differences (background, perceptions of officials and
teams) for three reasons. One was to provide a context to evaluate our primary findings. This
context was provided by the descriptive statistics presented previously. For example, FIFA was
Table 3. Relationships between country level corruption (WB13) and perceptions of FIFA and the World Cup.
Coefficient t-ratio p-level
FIFA corruption .17 2.38 .024
FIFA organization -.13 2.93 .007
Interest in World Cup .12 < 1 ns
Referees’ quality (competence) .14 2.02 .054
Corruption referees .00 < 1 ns
Referees’ neutrality favorite team -.02 < 1 ns
Referees’ neutrality least favorite team .00 < 1 ns
Corruption favorite team -.04 1.16 .258
Corruption least favorite team -.04 < 1 ns
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222492.t003
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generally viewed as corrupt, whereas referees were not. Second, we collected these additional
measures to provide a basis examining, on an exploratory basis, relationships between percep-
tions of corruption in FIFA and these other measures. Given the lack of quantitative research
on perceptions of corruption in FIFA, we thought describing such relationships would be valu-
able. Third, and most relevant to the primary focus of this article, we wanted to control for the
possibility that relationships between perceptions of corruption in FIFA and country-level per-
ception did not reflect these relationships per se but reflected relationships between percep-
tions of corruption in FIFA and some type of more general negative evaluation (e.g.,
dissatisfaction with life, perceptions of corruption among referees).
Relationships between perceptions of corruption in FIFA and other individual differences
were examined with the following model. The predictor (e.g., satisfaction with life) was entered
group mean centered with a random error term. Significance tests were done at level 2
(between country). Was γ10, the coefficient representing the mean slope between perceptions
of corruption in FIFA and a predictor, significantly different from 0?:
Within-country : yij ¼ b0j þ b1jðPredictorÞ þ rij
Between-country : b0j ¼ g00 þ u0j
b1j ¼ g10 þ u1j
A separate analysis was done for the following predictors: satisfaction with life, interest in
the World Cup, perceptions of FIFA’s competence in organizing the World Cup, perceptions
of corruption among officials, perceptions of referees’ competence and neutrality, and percep-
tions of corruption among players on respondents’ favorite and least favorite teams. The
results of these analyses are presented in Table 4.
As can be seen from the coefficients in Table 4, with the exception of perceptions of corrup-
tion among players on the least favorite team, each of these individual differences was signifi-
cantly related to perceptions of corruption in FIFA. Life satisfaction and perceptions of FIFA’s
organization of the World Cup were negatively related to perceptions of corruption in FIFA,
whereas interest in the World Cup and perception of corruption among officials and players
on the favorite team were positively related to perceptions of corruption in FIFA.
As stated previously, we collected these additional measures to control for the possibility
that relationships between perceptions of corruption in FIFA and country level corruption
(WB13) reflected relationships between country level corruption and other measures. For
most measures, this possibility was precluded by the fact that relationships between these
Table 4. Individual level relationships between perceptions of corruption in FIFA and other individual difference
measures.
Coefficient t-ratio p-level
Satisfaction with life -0.04 3.23 .003
Interest in World Cup 0.56 2.62 .014
FIFA organization -0.44 -12.51 .0001
Referees’ quality (competence) -.23 9.30 .054
Corruption referees .24 12.87 .0001
Referees’ neutrality favorite team -.16 3.87 .001
Referees’ neutrality least favorite team .24 6.70 .0001
Corruption favorite team .10 2.42 .015
Corruption least favorite team .04 1.11 ns
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0222492.t004
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measures and country level corruption were not significant. For the two measures for which
this relationship was significant (FIFA organization and referees’ competence), we conducted
analyses that controlled ratings of corruption in FIFA for individual differences in these two
predictors. This was done by entering these variables as grand-mean centered level 1 predic-
tors (separate analyses for each predictor). Grand-mean centering a level 1 predictor adjusts
the intercept for level 2 differences in a predictor [21].
For referees’ competence, the resulting coefficient representing the relationship between
the adjusted ratings was .20, which was functionally equivalent to the coefficient from the zero
order coefficient between WB13 and perceptions of corruption (.17). When controlling for
individual differences in perceptions of FIFA competence, the coefficient between WB13 and
perceived corruption in FIFA became non-significant although it remained positive (γ01 = .10,
t = 1.58, p = .12). Similarly, when controlling for individual differences in perceptions of FIFA
corruption, the coefficient between WB13 and perceived competence of FIFA became non-sig-
nificant although it remained negative (γ01 = -.05, t = 1.27, p = .21).
The estimated correlation between perceptions of FIFA corruption and competence was
-.45. This suggests that these measures could be considered to be observed measures of a
broader latent construct of “FIFA goodness.” This would not invalidate the observed relation-
ship between WB13 and perceptions of corruption in FIFA; rather, it would suggest that this
relationship is part of a broader set of relationships between WB13 and evaluations of FIFA.
The fact that perceptions of FIFA organization were not prepotent compared to perceptions of
corruption (if anything, changes in the size of coefficients suggests that perceptions of corrup-
tion were prepotent), means that perceptions of organization cannot be said to account for
relationships between WB13 and perceptions of corruption.
Additional analyses excluding Germany and the United States
Almost half of our respondents were from Germany and the US, which raises questions about
the extent which our results were dominated by relationships in those countries. To address
this issue we conducted all the analyses described above on a data set that did not include Ger-
many and the US– 27 countries with about 2500 respondents for most questions. These analy-
ses produced results that were functionally indistinguishable from the results previously
reported. For example, in the original analyses that included Germany and the US the mean
rating for corruption in FIFA was 3.717, and the coefficient between WB13 and perceptions of
corruption in FIFA was .174. When Germany and the US were excluded, the mean rating was
3.709, and the WB13 coefficient was .171 (t = 2.23, p = .035). Differences between the two sam-
ples in the coefficients from other analyses were similarly unimportant.
Discussion
Countries vary as to rule of law, corruption, effective government, political stability, and gov-
ernmental regulation. In our sample, these factors were highly correlated, so we combined
them into one measure of lawful trustworthiness/corruption. In our sample, citizens living in
countries high on lawful trustworthiness (or low on corruption) perceived more corruption in
FIFA than citizens living in less lawful and trustworthy societies. These results went against the
assimilation hypothesis, which held that living amid corruption would intensify one’s percep-
tion of corruption elsewhere. Instead, the findings fit the contrast pattern.
The link between societal corruption and perceiving corruption in FIFA does not mean
that people in non-corrupt societies see everyone as more corrupt. There was no relationship
between the country’s corruption index (WB13) and perceiving referees or players as corrupt.
These non-findings also speak against an assimilation process, which would have led people in
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corrupt societies to shrug and assume corruption is everywhere. Moreover, overall, partici-
pants perceived FIFA as corrupt; they did not see the players or referees as corrupt.
The specificity of perceived corruption (associated with FIFA but not with players or match
referees) is consistent with what the media reports had begun to indicate at the time the Cup
was held and with what subsequent investigations would establish. Why, then, were the ratings
of FIFA’s corruption higher in less corrupt than in more corrupt countries? Establishing the
causal process is beyond the scope of our data, but we can speculate. Contrast effects are based
on comparison, in this case presumably comparison with everyday life. People in societies that
are low on our WB13 measure may be accustomed to assuming widespread fairness and trans-
parency and may regard something like bribery over hosting a football tournament as shock-
ingly outside the norm—whereas people who experience corruption, lawlessness, and abuses
of power on a more regular basis may regard such bribery as relatively minor and inconse-
quential, just part of doing business in everyday life.
People living in countries with low trust, poor rule of law, and ineffective government did
not perceive FIFA as incompetent as people living in countries with higher trust, stronger rule
of law, and more effective government. The competence findings thus parallel the corruption
findings. People in well-run countries rated FIFA as both corrupt and incompetent. People in
less well-run countries rated FIFA less negatively on both dimensions. Again, this seems best
explained by assuming that people who live with serious problems of government corruption
and incompetence may be less shocked by football-related shenanigans, which after all do not
have much practical impact on people’s lives, as compared to people who generally expect
clean and effective government.
In contrast to the country level relationships between perceptions of FIFA officials and our
WB13 measure, we did not find significant country-level relationships between our WB13
measure and ratings of corruption among referees, but perhaps this is not surprising: FIFA
officials operate in secret, whereas game referees operate on worldwide television, and so refer-
ees’ misdeeds (corruption) might be more difficult to hide. Therefore, it is perhaps reasonable
for fans to assume that referees were generally honest and fair. The WB13 ratings were related
to the perceived competence of referees (the quality measure), with residents in more corrupt
and dysfunctional countries rating referees as less competent than residents in countries with
more effective government. That was the closest to any sort of country-level assimilation effect
we found.
Although mean ratings of corruption among players indicated that in general, respondents
did not think the players were corrupt, there was some acknowledgement that feigning fouls
was a problem. Fan bias was readily evident however in that participants gave high marks for
honesty to their favorite team but they gave low marks to players on the team they most disliked
in terms of corruption. Fan bias was also evident in ratings of referee bias. Consistent with the
findings of Hastorf and Cantril [9], fans seemed to think their own team was more virtuous and
their opponents less virtuous than what the referee called. They thought the referee was slightly
although significantly biased against their favorite team (2.87, where 3.0 was the neutral mid-
point representing impartial fairness). They thought the referees were biased in favor of the
team they disliked most, and the affirmation of this bias was significantly larger than the bias
against their favorite team (3.36 is significantly farther than 2.87 from the 3.0 midpoint).
It also possible that assuming referees are biased in these ways helps fans rationalize the
success of teams they dislike: Despised teams advance in the tournament not by playing well
but because referees allow them to get away with unfair tactics. This perception was stronger
among people with low vs. high life satisfaction. Meanwhile, thinking the referee was biased
against one’s favorite team helps explain either why one’s team lost or how particularly good
the team needed to be to win despite biased officiating.
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Individual level relationships
As noted by Nezlek [20] relationships at different levels of analysis are mathematically inde-
pendent, and so it is important to discuss our results at the individual-level of analysis. We
found more support for assimilation processes at the individual-level of analysis than at the
country-level. We found negative individual-level relationships between life satisfaction and
perceptions of corruption in FIFA and among referees. These results suggest that how satis-
fied people are with their lives influences their perceptions of other entities including institu-
tions. If someone’s life is going well, he or she is more likely to see things in a positive light
than if his or her life is not going well. Given the breadth of our measure of life satisfaction
we cannot know what specific factors might be responsible for such relationships, but the
possibility that life satisfaction is influenced by or influences perceptions of institutions
seems plausible and worthy of future study. The positive relationships between perceptions
of corruption in FIFA and corruption among the players on one’s favorite team and between
perceptions of corruption in FIFA and corruption among referees is also consistent with
assimilation processes.
Noting this, such assimilation would need to operate at a different level of analysis than
assimilation processes that might exist at a societal level. For example, perceptions of corrup-
tion among referees and corruption among players on one’s favorite team were not signifi-
cantly related to the WB13 measure. When making judgments about referee and player
corruption a “local” frame of reference may have been more influential than the more macro
frame of reference that may have been more influential when making judgments about FIFA.
If so, this would result in greater assimilation. In contrast, relationships between our WB13
measure and perceptions of corruption in FIFA clearly suggested a contrast process.
Our results suggest that assimilation processes existed at the individual level, while at the
same time, contrast processes existed at the societal level. To our knowledge, previous research
has not examined the possibility that assimilation processes occur at one level of analysis while
at the same time contrast processes occur at another. Answering such questions will require
research that is designed to do so.
Limitations and conclusions
Clearly, the generalizability of the present results is limited by the nature of the sample. We did
not obtain a stratified random sample in each country, and so we cannot be certain how repre-
sentative our respondents were of football fans in their respective countries. We are unware of
how self-selective motives of respondents might have compromised the validity of out conclu-
sions, but they may have. Similarly, we cannot be certain if our results would have changed if
more countries had been included. Despite these shortcomings, we believe that the present
results contribute meaningfully to our understanding of perceptions of corruption of interna-
tional sporting events as the World Cup and the Olympics.
Moreover, perceptions of such events can be important to understanding the in/out group
processes that they can engender. Competitors in such international competitions must be citi-
zens of the countries they represent, and national teams can carry the dreams and hopes of
their nations. Competitions between national teams can be “good-spirited” and can “bring out
the best in us,” or they can be “mean-spirited” and serve as opportunities to revisit ethnic and
cultural conflicts. Although FIFA, as an organization, has been quite active in trying to ensure
that football matches represent the former and not the latter, such efforts may be undermined
by the extent to which FIFA itself is viewed as corrupt. Moreover, recent events regarding the
upcoming men’s World Cup in Qatar [22] suggest that corruption among officials remains a
problem for FIFA.
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